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AN EMPIRICAL EXAMINATION OF 
SBA GUARANTEED LOANS: RATES, COLLATERAL, 
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ABSTRACT
We empirically examine a sample of over 350 entrepreneurial firms that successfully receive an SBA guar­
anteed loan. The first portion of the paper contains descriptive statistics that lend anecdotal evidence con­
cerning the organization type of borrowers, the incidence of collateral, the reasons for choosing the financial 
institution in which the SBA loan is secured, the main purpose for the SBA loan, and alternative actions that 
would have been undertaken had the SBA guaranteed loan not been obtained. The second portion of the 
paper poses theoretical predictions and tests them via multivariate models. Issues that are considered include 
the number of days required to obtain the SBA loan, management assistance services, agency theory, inter­
est rate determinants, and collateral determinants.
I. INTRODUCTION
Several articles have been published using the National Survey of Small Business Finances (NSSBF) 
prepared by the Federal Reserve and the Small Business Administration (SBA). These studies use either the 
NSSBF survey conducted in 1988 or the survey conducted in 1993. Petersen and Rajan (1994), Berger and 
Udell (1995), and Cole (1999) all investigate relationship lending between small firms and banks. They ail 
conclude that there is value in building banking relationships. Ang, Cole and Lin (2000) use the newer 
NSSBF survey to test the agency theory predictions of Jensen and Meckling (1976). Ang, et al. (2000) find 
support for various agency predictions based upon ownership structure and external monitoring variables. 
Finally, Brau (2000) uses the newer survey to test the impact of the agency variables in Ang, et al. (2000) on 
the loan rate and the requirement of collateral. All of these studies are similar in that they all contribute to 
our understanding of small firm finance. They are also similar in that they all use the general portion of the 
NSSBF survey as the base sample. Although not included in the newer NSSBF survey, the earlier survey 
contains a subsample of firms that received SBA guaranteed loans in 1986. This sample has been virtually 
ignored in the papers mentioned above.
In this paper, we conduct a rigorous analysis of the SBA sample of the 1988 NSSBF survey Our 
intent is two-fold. First, we provide detailed descriptive statistics of the firms that obtained the loans. These 
statistics include the organization type of borrowers, the incidence of collateral, the reasons for choosing the 
financial institution in which the SBA loan is secured, the main purpose for the SBA loan, and ahemative
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actions that would have been undertaken had the SBA guaranteed loan not been obtained. Second, we empir­
ically analyze the determinants of: i) the time to obtain the SBA loan, ii) measures of firm agency costs, iii) 
the rate charged on the SBA loan, and iv) the incidence of collateral with the SBA loan.
In this study, we pose the following research questions:
Do SBA guaranteed loans reduce the need for entrepreneurs to pledge personal collateral?;
Is the availability of SBA loans and SBA loan institutional assistance an important reason why entre­
preneurs choose a specific lender to borrow from?;
Do SBA guaranteed loans offer a source of seed financing?;
What determinants impact the time it takes for an entrepreneur to obtain an SBA guaranteed loan?;
Is management assistance services use correlated with the time to obtain an SBA loan, the rate of the 
SBA loan, or the requirement of collateral in the SBA loan?;
Do firms that obtain SBA guaranteed loans display the same agency costs as other firms?;
What determinants impact the SBA loan rate?; and
What determinants impact the requirement of collateral in SBA loans?
Our results indicate that SBA guaranteed loans do reduce the need for entrepreneurs to pledge per­
sonal collateral. Additionally, we find that entrepreneurs, to a large degree, choose the financial institution 
to borrow from based upon the availability of SBA guaranteed loans and SBA loan assistance. We provide 
evidence that many of the SBA loans in our sample represent seed financing and that management assistance 
services are not significantly correlated with the three loan characteristics stated above. Additionally we find 
that agency costs for the firms in our sample are not correlated with proxies for owner-manager separation 
and monitoring. Finally, we find many significant determinants that impact the time to obtain the SBA guar­
anteed loan, the rate of the loan, and the requirement of collateral.
The remainder of this paper is outlined as follows. Section II contains the data and descriptive sta­
tistics. In Section III, we describe the empirical tests and report the results. Section IV is the summary and 
conclusion.
II. DATA
We obtain the majority of the data for this study from the NSSBF 1988 survey. The NSSBF survey 
was conducted for the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and the SBA. The target popula­
tion for the SBA sample of the survey is all nonfinancial, nonfarm small businesses that received SBA-guar- 
anteed loans in 1986 and were in operation as of December 1987. The NSSBF SBA sample size is 390 firms. 
We obtain the survey results from the Federal Reserve web site and begin with a sample of 369 firms.
A second source of data for our study is the historical monthly prime rates for 1986. We obtain these 
data from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis website (i.e.. Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED) site).
Descriptive Statistics
Selected descriptive statistics for the sample are given in Table 1. Panel A describes the ownership 
strucmre and age of the firm. The family owned indicator variable equals one when the firm is either a pro­
prietorship or more than 50% of the firm is owned by a single family and zero otherwise. Eighty-four per­
cent of the sample has a value of one. The owner-manager indicator equals one when the owner manages the 
firm and zero otherwise. Eighty-eight percent of the sample has a value of one. The next variable in Panel 
A indicates that the average firm is approximately 16 years old. Finally, the average number of employees 
in the sample firm is 13 with a maximum of 120, all clearly qualifying as a “small business” under the SBA 
cap of 500 employees.
Panel B reports various bank and loan characteristics. The bank and S&L concentration variable is a 
herfindahl index that measures the geographical concentration of commercial bank and savings and loan 
deposits. This variable represents three divisions of concentration that can be thought of as heavy, normal, 
and light. The number of years the firm has done business with the lending institution averages 6.2 for the
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Table 1
Descriptive Statistics for Sample of 1986 SBA Guaranteed Loan Recipients
_________ Variable_________
Panel A. Firm characteristics
Family owner dummy 
Owner-manager dummy 
Age of firm (years)
Number of employees
Panel B. Bank/loan Characteristics
Bank and S&L concentration 
Lending years relationship 
Loan amount ($)
Loan term (months)
Loan rate (%)
Panel C. Financial ratios
Operating Profit ($)
Total Assets ($)
Total Liabilities ($)
Market Value ($)
Book Value ($)
Sales ($)
sample. Next Panel B reports that the average loan amount is $116,508 for an average term of 73 months at 
an average rate of nearly 11%.
Panel C reports six financial variables for the borrowing firms. The average firm in the sample has 
operating profits of $80,109 on an average $1,004,986 in sales revenue. Balance sheet items indicate total 
average assets of the sample as $458,339 and total average liabilities as $334,046. Market value of the firm 
is reported at approximately 6 times that of book value of the firm; however, the large majority of these small 
firms are not publicly traded and the market values are estimated by the owners. Thus, the reliability of the 
market value estimate may be in question.
The industry breakdown of the sample is reported in Table 2. This table uses the same industry clas­
sifications as Table I of Petersen and Rajan (1994). The SBA sample is dominated by Retail Trade (37.4%), 
Services (27.6%), and Manufacturing (15.7%). The same three industries are heavily represented in Petersen 
and Rajan (1994). The main exception to this observation of similar distributions is the construction sector 
which represents 13.1% of the Petersen and Rajan (1994) sample and only 5.4% of the SBA sample. These 
industry comparisons are for description only. The NSSBF documentation states that the overlap between 
the main sample (i.e., that used in Petersen and Rajan (1994)) and the SBA sample are unknown and that it 
is not possible to derive weights for combining the samples. The documentation continues to warn that the 
two samples should not be analyzed jointly. We make no attempt to construct a weighting scheme that allows 
for joint comparisons and limit our comparisons between the two samples to casual observation only.
The next set of descriptive statistics is reported in Table 3. The sample is composed of 119 (32.2%) 
Proprietorships, 19 (5.1%) Partnerships, 53 (14.4%) S-corporations, and 178 (48.3%) C-corporations. These
N Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum
369 0.84 0.37 0 1
369 0.88 0.32 0 1
369 15.67 21.66 0 175
365 13.24 16.92 1 120
369 1.86 0.80 1 3
365 6.19 7.22 1 50
309 116,508 176,964 1,600 1,300,000
301 73.36 71.83 0 360
233 10.91 1.98 4.75 18
361 80,109 447.825 -536,681 7,245,000
369 458,339 602,732 2,000 5,222,000
369 334,046 452,458 0 4,378,641
310 709,183 1,074,274 0 10,000,000
369 124,293 228,863 -450,801 1,934,000
369 1,004,986 1,446,460 20,000 14,268,124
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Table 2.
Industry Classification Frequency of SBA Guaranteed Borrowers
Industry Frequency Percent
Mining 0 0
Construction 20 5.4
Manufacturing 58 15.7
Utilities and Transportation 13 3.5
Wholesale Trade 36 9.8
Retail Trade 138 37.4
Insurance and Real Estate 2 0.5
Services 102 27.6
proportions are practically identical to those reported in Table II of Haynes (1996) who uses the 390 firm 
NSSBF SBA sample. Thus it appears the 21 firms that are excluded from our sample are approximately 
equally distributed in the four ownership classifications.
The final descriptive statistics in this preliminary section are reported in Table 4. Panel A lists the six 
classifications of loans reported in the NSSBF. Our sample has a fairly equal distribution of lines of credit, 
mortgages, vehicle loans, and equipment loans each at approximately 20%. Only one firm is granted a lease
Table 3.
Organization Type of SBA Guaranteed Borrowers
Frequency Percent
Cumulative
Frequency
Cumulative
Percent
Organization type
Proprietorship 119 32.2 119 32.2
Partnership 19 5.1 138 37.4
S-Corporation 53 14.4 191 51.8
C-Corporation 178 48.2 369 100
in our sample and the remaining 15% of the loans are classified as “other”.
Panels B and C report the incidence of collateral. Even with the SBA guarantee, 88% of the loans 
require collateral. Intuitively, mortgages, vehicle, and equipment loans are associated with collateral. These 
account for approximately 65% of the loans. Also of interest, Panel C reports the requirement of personal 
collateral. A potential benefit of an SBA guaranteed loan might be a reduction of personal risk exposure by 
entrepreneurs. Specifically, the SBA guarantee may mitigate the requirement of personal collateral. Our 
sample indicates that only 6% of the owners had to pledge personal collateral which is in stark contrast to the 
results reported in Ang, Lin and Tyler (1995). Using the general sample of the 1988 NSSBF survey, Ang, et 
al. (1995) report that over 27% of the owners in their sample must pledge personal collateral (i.e., either per-
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Table 4.
Loan Type and Collateral Requirements of SBA Guaranteed Loans
Frequency Percent
Panel A. Loan Type
Line of credit 64 20.3
Mortgage 66 21.0
Vehicle 63 20.0
Equipment 75 23.8
Lease 1 0.3
Other 46 14.6
Panel B. Any collateral secures loan
No 274 88.1
Yes 37 11.9
Panel C. Personal collateral secures loan 
No 341 93.9 
Yes 22 6.1
sonal real estate or other personal assets). We compute the 27% figure using a weighted average of the first 
two rows in the Ang, et al. (1995) Table 1, Panel B. Ahhough it is not possible to compute statistical tests
between the two samples without a weighting scheme, it appears that one direct benefit of the SBA guaran­
tee to entrepreneurs is that the guarantee limits personal risk exposure.
III. EMPIRICAL TESTS AND RESULTS
In this section, we test the research questions posed in the first section of the paper. We use the vari­
ables that are reported in the descriptive statistics section as well as others to rigorously analyze the charac­
teristics of SBA guaranteed loans.
Choosing the Lending Institution
One measure of the efficacy of SBA loans is the ranking of the reasons why entrepreneurs chose their 
specific lender. Table 5 reports the top 15 first reasons (Panel A) and the top 15 second reasons (Panel B) 
why the borrowing firm chose the institution in which it did. When asked the primary reason the entrepre­
neur chose its specific lender. Panel A reports that nearly 14% responded with its location as the top reason. 
The next three reasons provide further evidence of the value of relationship lending and adds to the studies 
of Petersen and Raj an (1994), Berger and Udell (1995), and Cole (1999). The survey contains two reasons 
that relate to SBA loans. The first is the availability of the SBA loan, which ranks sixth with just over 5% of 
the responses. The second reason is that the institution helped the firm obtain the SBA loan, which accounts 
for nearly 3% of the responses and ranks as the tenth first reason entrepreneurs chose their lender. Both of 
these SBA responses are in the top ten and combined encompass nearly 8%. of the total responses. In the 
aggregate, SBA reasons rank as the third most important reason for lender choice.
When asked the second reason that determined their choice of institution, entrepreneurs listed avail­
ability of SBA loans as the third reason (5.8%) and that the institution helped them obtain the SBA loan as 
the 13th reason (2.9%) (Panel B). In the aggregate, SBA reasons comprise 8.7% of the responses which 
rivals the top reason of location (which received 8.8% of the responses). The resuhs reported in Table 5 sug­
gest that SBA factors are important determinants of whether a borrowing firm chooses a specific institution.
Intentions of the Firm Acquiring an SBA Guaranteed Loan
In this section, we discuss the intentions and characteristics of the borrowing firms in the sample. 
One of the highest hurdles entrepreneurs face is acquiring seed capital. This seed capital may take several 
forms. Some of the sources of seed capital are venture capital (e.g., Barry, et al. (1990), Megginson and 
Weiss (1991), and Brav and Gompers (1997)), angel financing, small corporate offering registrations 
(SCORs) (Brau and Osteryoung (2000)), personal capital (Van Auken and Carter (1989)), and bank financ­
ing (Justis (1982)). One of the purposes of the SBA is to assist entrepreneurs in the acquisition of seed cap­
ital (Bates (1974) and Haynes (1996)). Table 6 reports the survey results of whether the SBA loan obtained 
by the firm in 1986 was the first loan the borrower ever obtained from a financial institution. Over 60% of 
the sample indicates that this SBA loan is their first institutional loan. If we assume that first time loans serve 
as a proxy for seed capital, then this result lends evidence that the SBA is providing access to seed capital for 
entrepreneurs.
As a further refinement of the measure reported in Table 6, Table 7 reports the main purpose of the 
SBA loan. In support of the SBA mission to assist entrepreneurs in obtaining seed capital, the most popular 
purpose of the SBA loan is to start the business (44.4%). Next, over 33% of the sample responds that the 
SBA loan is used to expand an existing business. Also of interest, only 10% of the firms report that the SBA 
loan is to help the firm remain solvent. Thus it appears that the majority of entrepreneurs are not using the 
SBA loans out of a desperate attempt to stay in business, but to begin and grow their business. Tables 6 and 
7 support the notion that the SBA does assist in providing access to seed capital for entrepreneurs.
Another interesting question that tests the efficacy of the SBA guaranteed loan program is what the 
firms in the sample would have done had they not been able to obtain the SBA guaranteed loan. Table 8
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Table 5.
Reasons for Choosing Financial Institution at Which SBA Loan is Secured
Panel A. The top 15 first reasons
Cumulative Cumulative
Rank Reason Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
1 Location, proximity 49 13.8 49 13.8
2 Started with institution, long-term relationship, familiarity 30 8.4 79 22.2
3 Owner has personal or other business with institution 28 7.9 107 30.1
4 Owner knows officers or employees of institution 23 6.5 130 36.6
5 Availability of credit, only institution to give credit 22 6.2 152 42.8
6 Availability of SBA loans 18 5.1 170 47.9
7 Convenience -  Not ascertained 17 4.8 187 52.7
8 Other recommendation 13 3.7 200 56.4
9 Local, institution’s participation in conununity 11 3.1 211 59.5
10 Helped firm obtain SBA loan 10 2.8 221 62.3
11 Only institution in town 10 2.8 231 65.1
12 Dissatisfaction with previous institution 8 2.2 239 67.3
13 Willing to work with firm, flexibility 8 2.2 247 69.5
14 Previous loan 7 2 254 71.5
15 Firm was using institution when acquired 7 2 261 73.5
16 All other responses 95 26.5 356 100.0
Panel B. The top 15 second reasons
Cumulative Cumulative
Rank Reason Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
1 Location, proximity 12 8.8 12 8.8
2 Started with institution, long-term relationship, familiarity 9 6.6 21 15.4
3 Availability of SBA loans 8 5.8 29 21.2
4 Owner knows officers or employees of institution 7 5.1 36 26.3
5 Local, institution’s participation in community 6 4.4 42 30.7
6 Services -  not ascertained 6 4.4 48 35.1
7 Always meets needs, reliable 6 4.4 54 39.5
8 Friendly/good treatment, like the people 6 4.4 60 43.9
9 Personal service, deals with one person, access 6 4.4 66 48.3
10 Availability of credit, only institution to give credit 5 3.6 71 51.9
11 Quality of services 5 3.6 76 55.5
12 Willing to do business or take risk with small business 5 3.6 81 59.1
13 Helped firm obtain SBA loan 4 2.9 85 62
14 Soundness, safety, financial health of instimtion 4 2.9 89 64.9
15 Low or competitive prices -  not ascertained. 4 2.9 93 67.8
16 All other responses 44 32.2 137 100.0
reports the results of this question. The majority of the firms (37.1%) report that they would have obtained 
similar financing elsewhere. The second row indicates that 19.5% would have obtained financing elsewhere 
with less favorable terms. Thus, the majority of the entrepreneurs are confident that they could obtain the 
needed external financing had the SBA guaranteed loan not been approved. In contrast, 14.1% of the firms
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Table 6.
SBA Guaranteed Loan is First Business Loan
This SBA loan was the first loan the firm obtained from a financial institution
Frequency Percent
Yes 222 61.3
No 133 36.7
Denies having a loan 7 1.9
Table 7.
Main Purpose of the SBA Guaranteed Loan
Main purpose of SBA loan
Frequency Percent
Start the business 157 44.4
Expand the business 119 33.6
Stay in the business 35 9.9
Other 43 12.1
would have discontinued expansion plans, 16.2% of the firms would not have been able to open, and nearly 
6% state they would have gone out of business. It is important to note that well over half of the sample 
(62.9%) would have incurred a cost had they not obtained the SBA guaranteed loan. These results suggest 
that SBA loans are valuable to entrepreneurs.
Table 9 reports entrepreneur responses to the question of whether they have applied for a loan since 
receiving the SBA loan. This question informs us if the SBA loan with its $116,000 average principle for the 
sample is sufficient in meeting the borrowers’ external financing needs. Nearly half (46.9%) of the borrow­
ing firms report that they have sought additional loans between the time they received the SBA guaranteed 
loan in 1986 and the time the survey was administered between 1987 and 1988. This result indicates that the 
SBA loans did not provide the sufficient capital needed for at least half of the firms in the sample. It is 
important to note however, that an additional need for external capital may have surfaced in the period of time 
between the SBA loan and the survey and the borrower may have acquired all of the debt financing it was 
seeking at the time of the SBA loan. Thus it is not possible from the data to determine if borrowers were 
simply denied the full amount of their requested loan or if the additional need developed after the initial SBA 
loan was obtained.
Number of Days to Obtain the SBA Loan
Haynes (1996) reports that over 90% of all loan guarantee applications submitted to the SBA are
Table 8.
Alternative Financing Actions
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124 37.1
65 19.5
47 14.1
54 16.2
19 5.7
25 7.5
Action firm would have taken had SBA loan not been obtained
_________________________________________  Frequency Percent
Obtained similar financing elsewhere
Obtained financing elsewhere with less favorable terms
Discontinued expansion plans
Not opened
Gone out of business
Other
approved and infers that the evaluation procedures employed by the lender are the most important. He also 
states that if a lender uses the SBA guarantee program frequently enough to be classified as a preferred lender 
then no SBA review is required. If the lender is not preferred, then the SBA review process may take from 
two to fourteen days. In this section, we report the time it takes the borrowing firms to obtain their loans. 
Additionally, we estimate a multivariate regression model to explore the determinants of the time delay in 
obtaining the loan. These findings may be of help to entrepreneurs who wish to limit the wait between the 
time of application and approval of SBA loans.
Figure 1 contains a chart of the number of days each loan took to process. The most common peri­
od is 60 days (16.8%). The second most common response is 90 days (15.6%). The remaining responses are 
distributed between 7 days (10 firms) and 730 days (6 firms). The sample is divided exactly in half at the 
63-day mark. Assuming that the 0-14 day SBA time period reported in Haynes (1996) is correct, then the 
lending institutions take approximately 1.5 to 2 months to process the loan.
In an attempt to examine the determinants of the time to process the loan, we estimate a tobit regres­
sion model. It is necessary to use a tobit methodology because the dependant variable is truncated at zero. 
The model is specified as:
Number o f days = a  + Zj=| 4Pj Firm 's use o f loan variables + Zj=5 -yPj Firm characteris­
tics + 2^1=8,12^ 1 ^  ^oan characteristics + Financial ratios + 2^ i=i7 ipPj 
Owmership structure variables + 2^i=20,23Pi variables + li=24 28^1 industiy vari­
ables + £, (1)
where the dependent variable is the number of days required to obtain the loan and the specific independent 
variables are as listed in the first column of Table 10.
For each independent variable, we discuss the theoretical prediction for the sign of the coefficient and 
then report the results from the estimated model. The first loan dummy variable equals one when this is the 
firm’s first loan from a financial institution and zero otherwise. If we assume there is a learning curve to 
applying for and obtaining a loan, then it follows that first time borrowers will take longer to acquire the loan. 
The empirical prediction is that the coefficient for the first loan dummy will be positive and significantly dif­
ferent than zero. The estimate for the coefficient reported in Table 10 supports this finding with statistical
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Table 9.
Additional Loan Applications Following SBA Guaranteed Loan
Firm has applied for a loan since receiving the SBA loan
Frequency Percent
Yes
No
168
190
46.9
53.1
significance beyond the one percent level.
The three loan-use indicator variables that follow equal one if the condition listed in Table 10 is met 
and zero otherwise. The variable that is omitted is the indicator that the firm is acquiring the loan to start the 
business. The expand the business dummy variable is predicted to be negative, as more established firms 
should be higher on the lending learning curve. The stay in business indicator is predicted to be positive as 
we expect firms in financial distress will be more heavily scrutinized by lenders. Both of the coefficients for
Figure 1.
Number of Days Needed to Obtain an SBA Guaranteed Loan
c
3
a-
CD
w0
1 4 ^
_UL:
CM CM r j  CO
Number of Days
these variables have the expected sign, however they are not statistically different from zero. The other use 
dummy is included in the regression so the intercept will cleanly capture the omitted start the business
10
Table 10.
Tobit Regression of the Number of Days to Obtain an SBA Guaranteed Loan
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Estimated
Coefficient
Standard
Error
Chi
Square p-value
Intercept -100.57 28.45 12.50 0.0004
Finn’s use of loan
First loan dximmy 23.82 4.51 27.89 0.0001
Expand business dummy -1.93 5.62 0.12 0.7314
Stay in business dummy 11.04 7.37 2.24 0.1342
Other use dummy -7.38 5.86 1.59 0.2079
Firm characteristics
Owner-manager dimmiy -3.72 5.87 0.40 0.5261
Family ownership dummy -16.03 4.95 10.48 0.0012
Age of firm -0.48 0.08 38.12 0.0001
Bank/loan characteristics
Bank/S&L Concentration -0.71 2.33 0.09 0.7601
Lending relationship length 0.30 0.27 1.24 0.2654
Loan amount 8.E-05 0.00 21.63 0.0001
Loan term -0.08 0.04 4.66 0.0308
Collateral Dummy 25.89 6.64 15.21 0.0001
Financial ratios
Operating profit -6.E-06 0.00 1.98 0.1597
Log of total assets 15.61 2.19 50.80 0.0001
Times interest earned 0.13 0.18 0.52 0.4715
Debt to equity ratio -0.08 0.06 1.81 0.1784
Ownership structure
S-corporation dummy 16.22 5.59 8.41 0.0037
Partnership dummy 53.22 11.58 21.10 0.0001
C-corporation dummy 23.95 4.62 26.86 0.0001
Type of Loan
Mortgage 0.95 7.42 0.02 0.8984
Vehicle
-34.86 6.37 29.93 0.0001
Equipment
-28.58 6.13 21.75 0.0001
Other loan type 15.46 6.45 5.75 0.0165
Industry Variables
Construction
-70.72 8.17 74.89 0.0001
Manufacturing
-25.06 5.75 18.98 0.0001
Retail 6.63 4.79 1.92 0.1656
Wholesale
-19.87 6.80 8.53 0.0035
Transportation -5.62 8.88 0.40 0.5268
dummy variable and is not significant.
The next group of regressors represents various firm characteristics. The first two are used to serve 
as proxies for potential agency costs. Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue and Ang, et al. (2000) show that 
firms with outside managers experience greater agency costs than those with owner-managers. Additionally, 
firms that are owned by one family may have greater monitoring and thus decreased agency conflicts. If
11
potential agency costs raise a red flag for borrowers, then it follows that loans to firms that display high 
agency possibilities may require more rigorous scrutiny. Therefore we predict the coefficients of both the 
owner-manager dummy and the family ownership dummy to be negatively related to the number of days 
required to obtain the loan. Table 10 reports that both of these variables have the predicted sign, but only the 
family ownership dummy is statistically significant (p = 0.0012).
The final variable in the firm characteristic category is the age of the firm. Firms with an established 
track record may pose less risk and may be easier to evaluate by lending officers. Thus we predict that the 
coefficient of firm age will be inversely related to the number of days to acquire the loan. The empirical 
results indicate that the coefficient is negative and significantly different from zero beyond the one percent 
level.
Continuing down the first column in Table 10, the next group of regressors is the bank and loan char­
acteristic variables. The bank and S&L herfindahl index measures the geographical concentration of deposits 
in institutions servicing the borrowing firm. We predict that areas with more concentration will have insti­
tutions that are forced to be efficient in the competitive environment. Thus we predict an inverse relation­
ship between the concentration metric and the number of days to acquire the loan. Empirically, the sign of 
the coefficient is correct, however it is not significantly different from zero.
Petersen and Rajan (1994), Berger and Udell (1995), and Cole (1999) find evidence that lending rela­
tionship contain value. The next variable extends their tests to determine if the length of the lending rela­
tionship benefits a borrower by decreasing the number of days it takes to acquire the SBA guaranteed loan. 
We predict a negative relationship between the lending relationship length and the number of days to acquire 
the loan. Table 10 reports that the coefficient is positive, contrary to our prediction, however it is not signif­
icantly different from zero. This finding suggests that although lending relationships are of value in certain 
other areas (e.g., loan rates and credit availability) the length of lending relationship does not shorten the 
number of days required to obtain an SBA loan.
The next variable we consider is the loan amount. Intuitively, the larger the loan amount, the more 
risk the lending institution assumes. Additionally Hancock and Wilcox (1998) report that the SBA guaran­
tees 80% of loans up to $100,000 and only 75% of loans over $100,000. Thus, lending institutions incur 
more risk for the unsecured portion of larger loans. As a result, we predict that borrowers who request larg­
er loans must wait longer for loan approval while lenders screen them more carefully. The empirical find­
ings support this prediction with a coefficient on the loan amount variable positive and significant beyond 
the one percent level.
The loan term (i.e., length of loan) variable is considered next. Loans with longer maturities force 
the lending institution to incur more risk, as there is a greater probability of default over the period of the 
loan. We therefore predict a positive relationship between the loan term and the number of days required to 
obtain the loan. The empirical findings are contrary to our prediction. Hancock and Wilcox (1998) report 
that the SBA loan guarantee program is primarily intended to promote longer-term small business financing. 
One possible explanation for the empirical loan term result is that the SBA may give a higher priority to 
longer-term loans to fulfill this objective.
The final loan characteristic variable is the collateral dummy. There are two competing predictions 
for this variable. First, loans that include collateral reduce the risk borne by the lender, decreasing loan 
scrutiny and resulting in fewer days to approve the loan. Alternatively, riskier firms may be required to offer 
collateral and as such will be screened more rigorously. Empirically, the latter explanation is supported. 
Firms that must offer collateral also must wait longer for loan approval, suggesting that they must be more 
heavily screened.
The next grouping of explanatory variables is the financial ratios. We include these measures to 
control for the financial health and debt capacity of the borrowing firm. The only coefficient that is signif­
icantly different from zero is the log of total assets, which has a positive sign, indicating that on average larg­
er firms must wait longer for loan approval.
Next, the model incorporates the ownership structure of the firm. The three variables estimated are 
the s-corporation dummy, c-corporation dummy, and partnership dummy which each equal one if the firm
The Journal of Entrepreneurial Finannce 6(1)  2001
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has the specific ownership form and zero otherwise. We omit proprietorships and thus the three indicator 
variables reported are benchmarked to proprietorships. The proprietorship is the simplest form of ownership 
structure and as such may be the easiest for loan officers to evaluate. Additionally, owners of proprietorships 
have unlimited personal liability and as such may be more careful when requesting external debt financing 
because additional debt increases their financial risk exposure. Following this logic, we predict the s and c- 
corporations and partnerships will be positively related to the number of days required to obtain the SBA 
guaranteed loan. Empirically, Table 10 indicates that all three variables are consistent with this prediction, 
all significant beyond the one percent level.
The last nine variables included in the model are additional control variables. We have specified the 
model so we can directly control for the type of loan and the industry of the borrower. Six of these nine vari­
ables are significantly different than zero. The type of loan variables are compared to lines of credit which 
are captured in the intercept. The industry variables are compared to the service industry firms. The results 
indicate that vehicle and equipment loans take significantly less time for the loan to process than lines of 
credit. The industry results indicate that construction, manufacturing, and wholesale firms all require less 
time to obtain the loan than service firms.
In this section, for the first time to our knowledge, we have explored many of the determinants of the 
time to obtain an SBA guaranteed loan. The majority of the empirical findings support the theoretical pre­
dictions we pose. These findings may be of value to entrepreneurs who wish to minimize the time it takes 
for them to obtain an SBA loan.
SCORE, SBSD, and other SBA Services
Much has been written on the effectiveness of the Service Corps of Retired Executives (SCORE) and 
the Small Business Development Center (SBSD) (e.g., Grose (1974), Lang and Golden (1989), Chrisman, 
Nelson, Hoy and Robinson (1985), Elstrott (1987), Wood (1994), and Chrisman and Katrishen (1994)). 
Studying small businesses in Georgia and South Carolina, Chrisman, et al. (1985) conclude that the SBDC 
program has a positive, cost-effective impact on small businesses. In a follow-up article, Chrisman and 
Katrishen (1994) draw the same conclusion using a national database of small firms. In this section, we 
report the incidence of SCORE, SBSD, and other SBA services in our sample. Additionally, we calculate 
Pearson correlations between each of these variables and the length of time required to obtain the loan, the 
interest rate charged on the loan, and the requirement of collateral.
Table 11 reports the incidence of service uses. Panel A indicates that only 12% of the firms in the 
sample employed SCORE and approximately 64% of the firms that used the service felt the assistance was 
either very or somewhat useful. Panel B indicates that approximately 10% of the borrowing firms used 
SBSD services and just over 80% of these entrepreneurs felt the service was useful. Finally, Panel C reports 
that only 5.5% of the sample used some other type of SBA service and approximately 79% of these users felt 
the service was useful. The results in Table 11 suggest that the borrowers in the sample feel the SBSD serv­
ices are the most effective and the SCORE the least effective with other SBA services in the middle.
In an attempt to support this anecdotal evidence with empirical tests, we next perform Pearson cor­
relations between the various services and the time it took to acquire the loan, the loan rate, and the require­
ment of collateral. These results are reported in Table 12. The first row for each variable is the correlation 
coefficient, the second row is the p-value for the null hypothesis that the coefficient is equal to zero, and the 
third row is the sample size. A negative correlation between the service and the time to obtain the loan, the 
interest rate, or the collateral requirement indicates that the service is useful and benefits the entrepreneur. 
The results in Panel A indicate that whether an entrepreneur uses SCORE or SBSC services, it is not 
significantly related to the time to obtain the loan, the loan rate, or the requirement of collateral. If the bor­
rowing firm used some other type of SBA service, then the firm also had to offer more collateral.
Panel B reports the results of correlations between the usefulness of the assistance as judged by the 
entrepreneurs and the time to obtain the loan, loan rate, and collateral requirement. A positive correlation
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Table 12.
Pearson Correlations of Management Assistance Programs
TIME RATE COLLATERAL
Panel A
SCORE 0.026 0.020 0.057
0.635 0.764 0.323
333 231 308
SBSD -0.003 -0.053 0.093
0.963 0.427 0.102
334 231 309
Other SBA service 0.063 -0.038 0.105
0.254 0.561 0.065
333 231 308
Panel B
SCORE usefulness 0.086 -0.025 0.251
0.585 0.901 0.145
43 27 35
SBSD usefulness 0.249 0.132 0.094
0.132 0.504 0.596
38 28 34
Other SBA service 0.357 -0.148 0.207
tisefiilness
0.160 0.600 0.396
17 15 19
with time indicates tliat those entrepreneurs who view the service as useful experience less time to obtain the 
loan. A positive correlation with loan rate indicates that entrepreneurs who felt the service was useful enjoy 
a lower interest rate. A positive correlation with collateral indicates that entrepreneurs who felt the service 
was useful offer less collateral. The signs of the Pearson correlations indicate that all three services (i.e., 
SCORE, SBSD, and other SBA services) all benefit the entrepreneur when considering time to obtain the 
loan and collateral. The results also suggest that only the SBSD usefulness benefited the loan rate. Although 
the signs of the coefficients support the success of the advisement services, the correlations are not 
statistically significant. The lack of statistical power may be due to the small sample sizes in each cell.
Agency Costs Within SBA Borrowers
Ang, et al. (2000) employ the 1993 NSSBF database to test the agency cost theoretical predictions of
15
Jensen and Meckling (1976). They find support for Jensen and Meckling’s predictions by employing two 
proxies to measure agency costs. The first is the ratio of operating expenses to sales and the second is the 
ratio of sales to assets. Ang, et al. (2000) argue that agency costs increase with the operating expense to sales 
ratio and decrease with the sales to assets ratio. Table 13 reports the results of an ordinary least squares 
(OLS) a model. The dependent variable is the operating expenses to sales ratio and the independent variables
Table 13.
OLS Regression of Operating Expenses to Annual Sales Ratio
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Variable
Estimated
Coefficient
Standard
Error t-stat p-value
Intercept 0.89 0.24 3.62 0.0004
Firm's use of loan
First loan dummy 4.E-03 0.04 0.10 0.9187
Expand business -5.E-03 0.05 -0.10 0.9230
dimuny
Stay in business dummy -0.01 0.06 -0.20 0.8393
Other use dummy -0.02 0.05 -0.43 0.6673
Firm characteristics
Owner-manager dummy 0.04 0.05 0.80 0.4250
Family ownership 0.02 0.04 0.58 0.5644
dununy 
Age of firm 0.00 0.00 -0.67 0.5009
Bank/loan characteristics
Bank/S«feL Concentration -4.E-03 0.02 -0.20 0.8423
Lending relationship 9.E-04 0.00 0.38 0.7070
length
Loan amount 8.E-08 0.00 0.75 0.4526
Loan term 6.E-05 0.00 0.21 0.8316
Collateral Dummy 0.05 0.06 0.86 0.3914
Financial ratios
Operating profit -3.E-08 0.00 -0.83 0.4083
Log of total assets -4.E-03 0.02 -0.21 0.8309
Times interest earned -5.E-03 0.00 -2.96 0.0034
Debt to equity ratio -6.E-04 0.00 -1.21 0.2270
Ownership structure
S-corporation dummy 0.07 0.05 1.41 0.1608
Partnership dunrniy 0.05 0.09 0.51 0.6096
C-corporation dunmiy 0.04 0.04 1.09 0.2751
Type of Loan
Mortgage -0.02 0.06 -0.37 0.7108
Vehicle 0.04 0.06 0.65 0.5136
Equipment 0.03 0.05 0.50 0.6185
Other loan type 0.04 0.06 0.63 0.5290
Industry Variables
Construction -0.66 0.07 -8.99 0.0001
Manufacturing -0.63 0.05 -12.40 0.0001
Retail -0.59 0.04 -14.19 0.0001
Wholesale -0.69 0.06 -11.64 0.0001
Transportation -0.03 0.08 -0.37 0.7137
Adjusted R-square 
F-stat
0.6276
16.047 0.0001
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are listed in the first column of the table. The only coefficients that are significantly different from zero are 
the time interest earned and four of the five industry control variables. An indirect relationship is found 
between the times interest earned ratio and operating expenses to sales. This finding follows from the idea 
that firms that can use debt efficiently (i.e., a high times interest earned) also operate efficiently in other areas 
of managing the firm (i.e., low operating expenses to sales) and vice versa. It is interesting to note that the 
four variables used by Ang, et al. (2000) to test for agency costs (i.e., owner-manager dimmiy, family own­
ership dummy, bank & S&L concentration, and the lending relationship length) are all non-significant. One 
explanation for the disparity between the Ang, et al. (2000) study and our findings is the sample differences. 
First, Ang, et al. (2000) use the newer NSBBF database while we use the earlier survey; second, our sample 
contains only firms that successfully obtained a SBA guaranteed loan; and third, Ang, et al. (2000) study only 
corporations whereas we include all firm ownership structures. Perhaps the screening criteria to satisfy an 
SBA loan creates a sample bias towards strong firms. Additionally, perhaps agency costs are not realized as 
much in these stronger firms.
To further analyze the agency cost implications we estimate a model similar to the preceding model, 
substituting the sales to assets ratio as the dependent variable. Table 14 reports the results. SBA borrowers 
whose use of funds is to stay in business have a positive relationship with the sales to asset ratio. This find­
ing suggests that these firms that are presumably desperate for external capital experience significantly lower 
agency costs than firms that require the funds to start the business. It appears the entrepreneurs who are 
struggling to stay in business have trimmed the fat from the business and are operating efficiently. This find­
ing supports the idea that lenders and the SBA are able to screen well and grant loans to firms that, although 
they need the funds to stay in business, operate efficiently.
The only variable of the four included in Ang, et al. (2000) that is significant is the coefficient on the 
lending relationship length. This variable serves as a proxy of the ability of the lending institution to moni­
tor the lender. Our model estimates a direct relationship between the length of lending relationship and the 
sales to asset ratio, contrary to the finding in Ang, et al. (2000). Again, the disparity of the two samples (i.e., 
the SBA selection bias) seems to be driving the conflicting results. Three of the control variables, one finan­
cial ratio, and three industry variables are also significant.
The main conclusion from this section is that the sample of SBA firms seems to display less signifi­
cant relationships between predictor variables and agency costs than the sample studied in Ang, et al. (2000). 
We hypothesize that this disparity may be attributed to the different samples employed in the two studies. 
Our sample may be biased towards stronger firms that are able to obtain SBA guaranteed loans and thus 
exhibit less agency conflicts.
Determinants of the Loan Rate
In this section we explore the determinants of the interest rate charged on the loan. Prior to estimat­
ing the model, we adjust the interest rate charged on the SBA guaranteed loan with the prime-lending rate 
for the month in which the loan was issued. It is particularly important to do this for 1986 data because the 
prime rate fell from 9.5% in January to 7.5% in December. If we do not adjust for the prime rate, then we 
introduce error into the estimation. The rates on the loans in our sample have a lower tail truncated at the 
prime rate, which when the interest rate is adjusted by prime, effectively truncates the rate at zero. As a result, 
we estimate a tobit model with the prime-adjusted interest rate as the dependent variable and th 
independent variables as listed in the first column of Table 15. The findings of the estimated model provide 
some interesting results.
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Firms that intend to use the SBA guaranteed loan to expand the business pay a higher rate of interest 
than firms that intend to use the external funds to start the business. This finding lends further evidence that
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Table 14.
OLS Regression of Annual Sales to Total Assets Ratio
Variable
Estimated
Coefficient
Standard
Error t-stat p-value
Intercept 35.03 7.34 4.77 0.0001
Firm's use of loan
First loan dummy -1.35 1.19 -1.13 0.2602
Expand business dummy 1.53 1.50 1.02 0.3088
Stay in business dummy 6.21 1.94 3.20 0.0016
Other use dunmiy 2.42 1.55 1.56 0.1206
Firm characteristics
Owner-manager dummy -0.34 1.53 -0.22 0.8238
Family ownership dimmiy -1.66 1.27 -1.30 0.1943
Age of firm 0.01 0.02 0.51 0.6097
Bank/loan characteristics
Bank/S&L Concentration 0.05 0.61 0.08, 0.9389
Lending relationship length 0.14 0.08 1.79 0.0746
Loan amount 3.E-06 0.00 0.89 0.3721
Loan term -4.E-04 0.01 -0.05 0.9638
Collateral Dummy -0.71 1.77 -0.40 0.6883
Financial ratios
Operating profit -2.E-08 0.00 -0.02 0.9843
Log of total assets -2.60 0.57 -4.61 0.0001
Times interest earned 0.03 0.05 0.65 0.5198
Debt to equity ratio 0.02 0.02 1.04 0.3004
Ownership structure
S-corporation dummy 0.07 1.53 0.05 0.9625
Partnership dunmiy -1.92 2.99 -0.64 0.5216
C-corporation dimmiy -1.31 1.23 -1.07 0.2874
Type of Loan
Mortgage -1.68 1.97 -0.85 0.3964
Vehicle -0.88 1.71 -0.51 0.6077
Equipment -0.15 1.65 -0.09 0.9279
Other loan type -3.24 1.73 -1.87 0.0624
Industry Variables
Construction 1.91 2.17 0.88 0.3798
Manufacturing 3.04 1.56 1.95 0.0526
Retail 1.84 1.27 L45 0.1486
Wholesale 2.93 1.78 1.64 0.1023
Transportation 13.26 2.46 5.40 0.0001
Adjusted R-square 
F-stat
0.1723
2.77 0.0001
the SBA makes efforts to provide attractive seed capital to start-up enterprises.
The firm characteristics group of variables indicates that firms in which the owner is the manager 
must pay higher interest rates. This finding is consistent with the results of Brau (2000) who provides evi­
dence that banks do not price potential owner-manager agency conflicts. The second variable in the firm 
characteristics group that is significantly different from zero indicates that older firms enjoy lower interest 
rates. This finding supports the idea that older firms are more established and less risky and as such enjoy
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Table 15
Tobit Regression of Loan Rate for Sample of SBA Guaranteed Loans
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Variable
Estimated
Coefficient
Standard
Error
Chi
Square p-value
Intercept 5.74 0.83 47.41 0.0001
Finn's use ofloan
First loan dummy 2.E-04 0.13 0.00 0.9986
Expand business dummy 1.14 0.16 50.30 0.0001
Stay in business dummy 0.22 0.21 1.09 0.2971
Other use dummy 0.76 0.17 19.60 0.0001
Firm characteristics
Owner-manager dummy 0.73 0.18 17.53 0.0001
Family ownership dummy -0.33 0.14 5.76 0.0164
Age of firm -0.01 0.00 15.53 0.0001
Bank/loan characteristics
Bank/S«&L Concentration 0.05 0.07 0.53 0.4669
Lending relationship 
length
0.06 0.01 42.83 0.0001
Loan amount -4.E-06 0.00 120.36 0.0001
Loan term 4.E-04 0.00 0.22 0.6392
Collateral Dummy -0.56 0.21 7.13 0.0076
Financial ratios
Operating profit 6.E-07 0.00 15.90 0.0001
Log of total assets -0.20 0.07 9.57 0.0020
Times interest earned 0.01 0.01 2.07 0.1498
Debt to equity ratio -3.E-03 0.00 3.28 0.0700
Ownership structure
S-corporation dummy -0.16 0.17 0.92 0.3365
Partnership dummy -1.25 0.30 17.11 0.0001
C-corporation dummy 0.02 0.13 0.03 0.8692
Type of Loan
Mortgage 0.03 0.21 0.02 0.9020
Vehicle -1.44 0.19 57.20 0.0001
Equipment -0.18 0.19 0.90 0.3423
Other loan type -1.16 0.20 34.51 0.0001
Industry Variables
Construction 0.07 0.25 0.09 0.7649
Manufacturing 0.29 0.17 3.02 0.0820
Retail 0.61 0.14 19.13 0.0001
Wholesale 1.13 0.18 37.80 0.0001
Transportation -0.19 0.25 0.57 0.4495
lower interest rates.
The final group of variables considered, the bank and loan characteristics category indicates that 
firms with longer lending relationships must pay higher rates of interest; the larger the loan, the lower the 
rate charged; and firms that pledge collateral incur lower rates. The lending relationship result is contrary to 
the existing lending relationship literature (e.g., Petersen and Rajan (1994), Berger and Udell (1995), and 
Cole (1999)). Once again, we rely on the explanation that our sample of SBA loans differs from the samples
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in the existing literature. Even with this sample explanation, we find this result very peculiar and surprising.
The last four groups of variables are again used to control for various factors. At least one, and usu­
ally two of the control variables in each group are significant, indicating that they are adequately controlling 
for their respective economic factors.
Determinants of Collateral
The final analysis we conduct considers the use of collateral in SBA guaranteed loans. To explore 
the collateral determinants, we estimate a logistical regression model. It is necessary to use a logistic regres­
sion methodology because the dependent variable is a binary choice indicator that equals one when the bor­
rower pledges collateral and zero otherwise. The independent variables are as listed in the first column of 
Table 16.
The results reported in Table 16 indicate that the firm's use of the loan is a significant factor in the 
requirement of collateral. When the SBA guaranteed loan is the first loan the firm has ever received, it must 
pledge collateral more often. This finding is consistent with the idea that young firms are riskier than estab­
lished firms and as such must pledge collateral as a form of insurance to the lender. Firms that intend to use 
the SBA loan to expand the business must offer collateral relative to firms that intend to use the loan to begin 
the business. When firms expand, they tend to buy additional assets. It follows that these additional assets 
must be pledged as a form of collateral. Finally firms that intend to use the loan to stay in business have a 
negative coefficient.
The second group of economic factors, firm characteristics, also has a significant impact on the inci­
dence of collateral. Firms that are managed by the owner must pledge less collateral consistent with the 
agency explanations of Jensen and Meckling (1976). The results also indicate that family owned firms and 
older firms are associated with a higher incidence of collateral.
The final group of determinants discussed is composed of the bank and loan characteristic variables. 
These findings indicate that the institutional concentration, the lending relationship, the loan amount, and the 
loan term are all positively related to the collateral requirement. In addition to these variables, many of the 
control variables also have coefficients significantly different from zero. One interesting note is that corpo­
rations must pledge collateral more often than partnerships and proprietorships. This finding is consistent 
with the idea that lenders require a collateral stake from corporations due to their limited legal liability.
IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have provided a rigorous analysis of a sample of over 350 small businesses that 
received an SBA guaranteed loan in 1986. We feel the results of this paper may be beneficial to entrepre­
neurs who are interested in obtaining SBA guaranteed loans. Specifically, we carefully describe the types of 
firms in our sample — a sample of firms that have successfully obtained an SBA guaranteed loan. Next, we 
test for determinants that impact the time it takes for an entrepreneur to receive an SBA loan, the SBA loan 
rate, and the requirement of collateral in SBA loans. We include variables that serve as proxies for the eco­
nomic factors of the firm’s use of the loan, firm ownership characteristics, financial institution and loan char­
acteristics, firm financial ratios, ownership structure of the firm, type of loan, and industry of the borrower.
We find that SBA guaranteed loans are a valuable source of external financing for entrepreneurs. Our 
tests indicate that SBA guarantees substitute for entrepreneur’s personal collateral. Additionally, we report 
that the availability of SBA loans and SBA loan assistance from institutions are important reasons why entre­
preneurs choose their lender. On average, nearly half of the firms that receive SBA guaranteed loans must 
seek additional external financing within the next two years. Firms in our sample do not display the same 
significant relationships between proxies for agency costs and owner-manager and monitoring explanatory 
variables as other samples of borrowing firms. Finally, variables from each of the economic factor groups 
listed in the preceding paragraph significantly explain the number of days to obtain the SBA loan, the SBA 
loan rate, and the requirement of collateral with the SBA loan.
The Journal of Entrepreneurial Finannce 6(1)  2001
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Table 16
Logistic Regression of Collateral for Sample of SBA Guaranteed Loans
Variable
Estimated
Coefficient
Standard
Error Chi-Square p-value
Intercept 2.87 0.99 8.31 0.0039
Firm's use of loan
First loan dummy 1.49 0.18 70.51 0.0001
Expand business dummy 0.92 0.21 18.66 0.0001
Stay in business dummy -0.51 0.26 3.93 0.0475
Other use dummy -0.28 0.21 1.91 0.1671
Firm characteristics
Owner-manager dummy -0.65 0.30 4.73 0.0296
Family ownership dimuny 0.34 0.17 4.20 0.0404
Age of firm 0.03 0.01 35.22 0.0001
Bank/loan characteristics
Bank/S&L Concentration 0.72 0.09 64.28 0.0001
Lending relationship length 0.05 0.01 13.65 0.0002
Loan amount 2.E-06 0.00 32.67 0.0001
Loan term 0.01 0.00 53.71 0.0001
Financial ratios
Operatmg profit 2.E-07 0.00 4.98 0.0256
Log of total assets -0.19 0.08 5.88 0.0153
Times interest earned -0.02 0.00 16.35 0.0001
Debt to equity ratio -0.01 0.00 14.45 0.0001
Ownership structure
S-corporation dummy 0.64 0.18 12.38 0.0004
C-corporation dummy 0.63 0.16 15.58 0.0001
Type of Loan
Line of credit -2.25 0.15 226.98 0.0001
Industry Variables
Construction -0.43 0.30 2.03 0.1546
Manufactiuing -1.31 0.21 37.60 0.0001
Retail -2.25 0.20 131.34 0.0001
Wholesale -1.95 0.23 72.07 0.0001
- 2 Log Likelihood 956.21 0.0001
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